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Abstract. Beginning in December 2004 Google has pursued a new project
to create a book search engine (Google Book Search). The project has
released a storm of controversy around the globe. While the supporters
of Google Book Search conceive the project as a first reasonable step
towards unlimited access to knowledge in the information age, its op-
ponents fear profound negative eﬀects due to an erosion of copyright
law. Our law and economics analysis of the Book Search Project sug-
gests that — from a copyright perspective — the proposed settlement may
be beneficial to right holders, consumers, and Google. For instance, it
may provide a solution to the still unsolved dilemma of orphan works.
From a competition policy perspective, we stress the important aspect
that Google’s pricing algorithm for orphan and unclaimed works eﬀec-
tively replicates a competitive Nash-Bertrand market outcome under
post-settlement, third-party oversight.
1. Introduction
George Orwell’s metaphor of a “big brother [who] is watching you” (Or-
well, 1949) appears to be no dystopia in 2011. The technological revolution
ushered in by the internet and the increase of possibilities in the digital
environment have facilitated a framework in which spying on the data of
everyone is a real possibility anywhere and at any time. Meanwhile, to
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“google” you and me has evolved into a widespread social sport.1 As the
“googlization of everything” (Vaidhyanathan, 2009) accelerates information
flows, the institutional framework is set in a rapidly changing and challeng-
ing environment. Beginning in December 2004 Google has pursued a new
project to create a book search engine by digitizing large numbers of books
from public and university library collections and subsequently making them
available and searchable worldwide via the internet. Since its inception, the
Google Book Search Project2 has released a storm of controversy around
the globe.3 While the supporters of Google Book Search (GBS) conceive
the project as a first reasonable step towards unlimited access to knowledge
in the information age, its opponents fear profound negative eﬀects due to
an erosion of copyright law. The recent class action settlement will entitle
Google to “make digital copies of the book collections of a number of [. . . ]
libraries” (Macqueen, 2009), inducing a significant paradigm shift in digital
copyright development. Despite this imminent revolution in the history of
copyright law, a comprehensive analysis from a law and economics perspec-
tive — particularly regarding the amended settlement released in November
2009 — remains rather scarce. Extending on the analysis of Lichtman (2008)
and other scholars and considering the changes made within the Amended
Settlement Agreement (ASA),4 we provide a law and economics analysis of
the Book Search Settlement. First, we briefly outline the history of the
Google Book Search Settlement. Section three provides an analysis of the
Google Book Search Settlement from a copyright and competition policy
1See Lehmann and Schetsche (2005) for a diﬀerentiated picture on the googlization in the
information age.
2In fact, the project was first announced by Google as “Google Print” and then renamed
to Google Book Search.
3See Bechthold (2010, p. 1), Na (2006, p. 418), and Kuhlen (2009, p. 568).
4See http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/view_settlement_agreement. A list of
changes comparing the amended settlement to the first settlement is available at http:
//www.googlebooksettlement.com/Supplemental-Notice.pdf.
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perspective. Section four gives a critical perspective on the options for an-
alyzing the project in general. In Section five, we comment on the recent
rejection of the ASA by Judge Chin. The conclusion completes the discus-
sion, noting recent developments and suggesting ideas for further research.
2. A Brief History of the Google Book Search Settlement
In the context of the Google Book Search project, Google has launched
a process to create a search engine which facilitates searching for particular
terms in published books. The project seeks to support users in locating
relevant content in books and to either buy the book — implicitly satisfying
the interests of publishers — or to find the identical substitute in libraries.5
2.1. The Google Book Search Project. The history of the Google Book
Search Project is a history of two closely related programs: (1) the Partner
Program, and (2) the Library Program.6 The former constitutes a formal
contract between Google and the copyright holder to provide digital copies
of (commercially) available books. In particular, Google works only with
books licensed for scanning by publishers or authors and hence material
which does not raise any copyright issues. Participants of the Partner Pro-
gram can decide to either send their book to Google to allow for a scanning,
or directly provide a full text version in a digital format. In addition, Google
may oﬀer to scan the book at a library.7 Consequently, Google seeks to max-
imize the accessibility to books, subject to the approval of the right holders.
Furthermore, publishers may determine the number of pages publicly acces-
sible. The search results Google oﬀers its users consist of a short excerpt of
5On this point, see Lichtman (2008, p. 57) and Ott (2007, p. 562).
6Note that the diﬀerentiation between the Partner Program and the Library Program is not
necessarily clear cut from the right holder’s perspective. Right holders may choose to have
some books in the Partner Program and others in the Library Program. Nevertheless, a
distinction is reasonable as Google’s approach in scanning book content diﬀers considerably
between the two programs. See ASA, Section 17.1.
7See Na (2006, p. 423).
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the book containing the search term entered by the user, allowing the user
to browse only a few sample pages. Participation of publishers and authors
in the Partner Program is encouraged by appealing to the financial interests
of the right holders. Integrated links to online book shops allow purchasing
the book. In addition, contextual advertisements enable participants in the
program to gain a new source of revenue.8
In the context of the Library Program, however, Google expands upon
the Partner Program by “scanning books en masse from the collections of
university and civic libraries” (Grimmelmann, 2009a, p. 11). This scanning
and indexing of books is based on an agreement between Google and the
libraries. In contrast to the Partner Program, though, Google operates
on the premise of passive consent since Google evades the right holders’
explicit permission. Copyrighted books are generally not excluded from the
digitization. However, right holders may opt out of the project. As a result,
Google currently gives publishers and authors a choice to either participate
in the Partner Program to influence the degree of access to their books or to
exclude their books from the Google Book Search by choosing to opt out.9
In general, Google will provide access to a greater part of the book as
copyright protection decreases by statute or as a consequence of an explicit
permission by its right holder (Na, 2006, p. 422). Public domain books of the
Library Project appear in full text version with an option to browse a book
online or directly download a PDF copy. For in-copyright books, Google
generally only allows access to snippets of a book containing the search term,
as long as no permission from the right holder has been signaled. Finally,
8See Band (2006. p. 1), Na (2006, p. 423 et seq.), and Grimmelmann (2009a, p. 11).
9See Ott (2007, p. 563) and Na (2006, p. 424 et seq.). With the amended settlement an
important update to the limitations on the right to remove or exclude one’s book has been
made. Article 3.5(a)(iii) extends the removal deadline as to Google from April 5, 2011 to
March 9, 2012. The removal deadline as to the libraries’ digital copies remains to be April
5, 2011. Besides, the new deadline to claim books and inserts for cash payments has been
changed to March 31, 2011.
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in-copyright books with permission appear in a limited preview, while the
right holder himself may decide on the degree of access. An opt out signal
by an author or publisher results in a complete denial of access to the book
(Grimmelmann, 2009a, p. 11 et seq., and Na, 2006, p. 422).
2.2. The (Amended) Settlement. A litigation over Google Book Search
was initiated by the Authors Guild10 and five publishers in fall 2005, suing
Google for copyright infringement. Google reverted to the so-called “fair
use” argument to legitimate their digitization project. In particular, Google
argued that their limited preview on the basis of snippets of book contents
was a fair and hence a non-infringing use of copyright material since the ac-
cessibility of knowledge and information was to be improved by the project.
The proceedings of the litigation resulted in a class action settlement, which
was announced by the Authors Guild, the Association of American Publish-
ers, and Google Inc. on October 28, 2008.
As a reaction to the concerns brought up against the primary settlement,
the parties filed an Amended Settlement Agreement (ASA) on November
13, 2009. The changes particularly have consequences regarding the inter-
national scope of the settlement. The new settlement will only include books
that were either registered with the US Copyright Oﬃce or published in the
U.K., Australia, or Canada up to January 5, 2009 (See ASA, Section 1.19).
The most important implication of the ASA is that it addresses in-copyright
books from the Library Program11 and would allow Google to continue with
the project. In particular, Section 2.1(a) of the settlement authorizes Google
to “sell subscriptions to the Institutional Subscription Database, sell indi-
vidual Books, place advertisements on Online Book Pages, and make other
10The Authors Guild represents an organization of and for publishing authors. In 2008 the
Authors Guild amounted to about 8,000 members, among them authors, literacy agents,
and attorneys. See http://www.authorsguild.org (visited 11 October 2010).
11Note that (in-copyright) books from the Partner Program can not be a subject matter of
copyright infringement since their provision by Google is based on explicit permissions of
their right holders.
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commercial uses of Books” in the United States. In this context, the agree-
ment is of particular relevance with respect to out of print books, and so
called “orphan works” for which locating of the copyright holder is virtually
impossible.
Most notably, the settlement will create a new collecting society: The
Book Rights Registry (BRR). The BRR will be created to mediate between
Google and the right holders and to distribute revenues from the settle-
ment. The BRR will be initially funded by Google with $ 34.5 million
(ASA, Section 2.1(c)) and be responsible to allocate $ 45 million (ASA, Sec-
tion 2.1(b)) in settlement funds for past uses of copyrighted books. Most
important, however, the BRR will allow Google to continue with their scan-
ning and indexing of in-copyright books without the explicit permission of
the right holders. In exchange, 63 percent of all revenues from integrated
advertisements and from individual purchases (“buy this book” link) will be
redistributed to authors and publishers who have registered their copyright
claims at the BBR.12
In addition, the ASA changed requirements for the BRR regarding the
eﬀorts to search for right holders of unclaimed works. In this regard, the
settlement specifies that the BRR may use up to 25 percent of unclaimed
funds earned in any one year that have remained unclaimed for five years
for attempting to locate right holders.13 The residual of unclaimed funds
is retained to the benefit of its right holders for a duration of at least ten
years and should be distributed to literacy-based charities directly or in-
directly benefiting the right holders and the reading public (ASA, Section
6.3(a)(i)(3)). In addition, the ASA stipulates the creation of the Unclaimed
12See ASA, Section 2.1(a).
13See ASA, Section 6.3(a)(i)(2).
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Works Fiduciary14 as an independent fiduciary monitoring the use of un-
claimed funds by the BRR15. Figure 1 illustrates the organization of the
BRR.
Figure 1. The Book Rights Registry (BRR)
The BRR will allow right holders to participate in the revenues that
come from the digitization of out-of-print books or orphan works on the
basis of a 63/37 split. In addition, the restriction of a redistribution of the
accumulated revenues to registered right holders only may induce incentives
for authors and publishers to participate instead of choosing an opt-out
strategy.
3. Google Book Search: A Law and Economics Analysis
An approval of the aspired settlement requires an in-depth analysis of
the proposed economic eﬀects, raising issues with respect to copyright law
and competition policy. Copyright as a national law raises diﬀerent issues
14See ASA, Sections 1.160 and 6.2(b).
15The Unclaimed Works Fiduciary may also license “to third parties the Copyright Interests
of Rightholders of unclaimed Books and Inserts to the extent permitted by law.”(ASA,
Section 6.2(b)(i)). The independent character of the fiduciary is reached by prohibiting
activity of any person or entity that is a published book author or book publisher. The
Unclaimed Works Fiduciary “will be chosen by a supermajority vote of the Board of
Directors of the Registry and will be subject to Court approval.”(ASA, Section 6.2(b)(iii)).
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concerning the analysis of a possible infringement since there are diﬀerences
especially between the US and European national copyright laws. Despite a
possible infringement of European national copyright laws, the “lex loci pro-
tectionis” principle constitutes the competence of the US law from interna-
tional law perspective.16 In addition, the amended settlement has narrowed
the international scope with respect to US works. Thus, an examination
needs to include the argument of the fair use doctrine. From a competition
policy perspective, a diﬀerent set of issues needs to be addressed, such as
price regulation, entry barriers or the question whether the Google initiative
creates a new monopoly on digital information.
3.1. A Copyright Perspective. In addition to the general catalogue of
exceptions in national copyright law, the US copyright law sets forth the
sweeping clause of a fair use according to 17 U.S.C. §107. In particular, the
courts will be required to consider four statutory factors in the evaluation
of a fair use claim, striving for a rule of reason in copyright law. A fair use
analysis will have to acknowledge (1) the purpose and character of the use,
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used and (4) the eﬀect of the use upon the potential market for
or the value of the copyrighted work. None of these four aspects, however,
is decisive for the court’s decision since these factors are non-exhaustive. In
fact, the court may consider the copyright user’s intention in the particular
case to come to a final judgment.17
3.1.1. Some Simple Economics of “Fair Use”. The exceptions in copyright
law in general, and the fair use doctrine in particular, follow some simple
economics. While the intention of copyright protection is to create incen-
tives for the creation of works in art, literature, and science, its enforcement
16See Ott (2007) on the competences of national copyright law on international level.
17See Ott (2007, p. 566 et seq.) and Lichtman (2008, p. 63 et seq.).
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results in a fundamental dilemma, trading oﬀ the benefits and costs associ-
ated with the establishment of a property right on intellectual creations.18
In this context, three dimensions emerge from the maximization problem:19
First, the duration of copyright, as the number of years a copyrightable
work is removed from public domain. Second, the depth20 of copyright,
which reveals the aspects of the creation that are protected by copyright.
Third, the breadth of copyright giving advice to the practices considered as
an infringement of copyright.
The idea of a fair use is assessed by the latter dimension of breadth. In
this respect, the breadth of copyright is limited, for example, to academic
use, teaching or home recording. From a welfare economics perspective,
the maximization problem reveals the existence of an optimal scope of the
protection provided by copyright. Landes and Posner (1989) emphasize
the relevance of a minimum standard of copyright protection, where “too
much” protection induces marginal costs (MC) of an extension in the scope
to exceed its marginal benefits (MB). Let W (S) denote the social welfare
subject to the scope (S) of copyright protection, where dW (S)/dS ≥ 0 for
S ≤ S∗ and dW (S)/dS < 0 for S > S∗, with S∗ revealing the optimal
scope satisfying for a maximization of the social welfare W (S). Thus, in
S∗, it is dW (S)/dS = MB = MC = 0 and hence MB(S∗) = MC(S∗).
Geometrically, this optimal scope is displayed by the horizontal tangent to
18The general literature on the economic analysis of intellectual property rights emphasizes
the social costs (i.e. dead weight loss) coinciding with the creation of a monopolistic
market structure by granting an exclusive right to the creator. In addition, the exclusive
character of the use will increase the costs for cumulative innovations, revealing a trade
oﬀ between static and dynamic eﬃciency. See Müller-Langer and Scheufen (2011) on this
point.
19See Watt (2004, p. 157), Landes and Posner (1989, p. 347 et seq), and Müller-Langer and
Scheufen (2011).
20In this respect copyright diﬀers from patents in so far as copyright does not protect ideas
but only expressions.
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Figure 2. Optimal Scope of Copyright and Fair Use
W (S) in Figure 2, leaving us with a maximum in S∗, where dW (S)/dS = 0
since W (S) exhibits an inverted u-shape.21
Apparently, there will be an optimal scope of copyright since the social
welfare is not strictly increasing in S. Consequently, a use will be expected to
involve an infringement of copyright as long as a protection of this use comes
along with a positive net gain in social welfare. In contrast, the scope is not
broadened to uses to the right of S∗ because an extension would cause social
welfare from copyright to decrease. A “fair use” analysis will then have to
balance the costs and benefits following the economics of this simple model.
This leaves us with the four stated factors to assess whether the Library
Program is justified by fair use or whether it involves an infringement of
copyright law.
21Note that the graphic as well as the technical arguments break things down to an ideal
type of the relationship between scope and economic returns.
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3.1.2. A “Fair Use” Analysis. An investigation of the first factor of the fair
use doctrine — purpose and character of the use — raises two important issues
to be evaluated. First, one must determine whether the use is commercially
driven. The economic intuition behind this aspect is the following: Infor-
mation goods exhibit the characteristics of a public good causing a market
failure in terms of an incentive to free ride on the sunk costs of the creator
of the copyrighted work.22 Thus, as a commercial use generates profits from
the exploitation of the property right, the original author and the copyright
holder should be compensated for his creative eﬀorts. The fact that Google
now generates revenues from the Library Program23 by licensing its collec-
tions to Sony for their e-book reader advances its potential for commercial
application.24 Consequently, a lone option for future net returns25 already
allows for the judgment of a commercial use with respect to the Google Book
Search Settlement. Nevertheless, a commercial use in and of itself does not
refute a fair use argument.
Second and even more important is the aspect of a transformative use.
The transformative nature of a use touches on the closeness and purpose of
the use compared to the original work. In this respect, the transformation of
an original work requires reasonable eﬀorts to augment the nature or func-
tionality of a work such as parody, while a mere change of the medium of a
copyright protected work is not suﬃcient to infer a transformative nature of
the use.26 A transformation of the original work then may legitimate a fair
22See Müller-Langer and Scheufen (2011) on the free riding problem with respect to infor-
mation goods.
23Note that the Partner Program is not subject matter of the settlement since Google seeks
to obtain explicit permission of the right holder by signing a formal contract with the
publisher of the copyrighted work.
24Garon (2010, p. 12). In particular, see http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/sony.pdf.
25The option of future net returns is obviously closely related to the question whether Google
is able to gain a certain degree of market power (See section 3.2.2.). Notably, the ability
for cost recovery eventually reveals a crucial incentive constraint for entering the market
in the first place.
26See Lichtman (2008, p. 65), Na (2006, pp. 437 et seq.), and Proskine (2006, p. 227).
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use due to two reasons: First, as the transformed work is considered diﬀerent
to the original, it is less likely to infringe the property right of the original
author and to reduce sales of the original work. Original and transformed
works may serve two diﬀerent markets. Second, as the process of transfor-
mation adds a new purpose to the original work, a transformative use may
create additional social benefits.27 Thus, the question is whether the digiti-
zation of books adds new purposes to the original works. A broadening of
the scope of copyright protection beyond transformative uses would prevent
the internalization of additional social surplus. Recalling the rationale of
the simple economic model in Figure 2, this first factor seeks a balancing
of the benefits and costs on the individual (the author) as well as on the
social planer level (social welfare). That is, as long as Google’s use would
satisfy the criterion of serving a new market (“meaningfully distinct”) and
adding social surplus (“new purpose”), Google’s use could satisfy as to be
to the right of S∗ in Figure 2. Thus, we could conceive of a scenario where
the nature of a transformative use countervails its commercial character.
Google’s purpose in digitizing books is to create the ability and the inno-
vative tool to search and retrieve snippets and hence to help in locating
information. In addition, by digitizing a significant portion of out-of-print
works, Google helps to make existing knowledge accessible and searchable;
whereas, at present, a significant portion of books are withdrawn from public
access.28 Consequently, the Google Book Search Project eventually satisfies
both issues of a transformative nature of use: Google creates a product
that is meaningfully distinct from the original work, and hence is not likely
27An important case and possible bargaining chip for Google’s argumentation in this con-
text, is Kelly v. Arriba. See http://www.linksandlaw.com/decisions-106.htm (visited
16 September 2010). The Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit found in a fundamental
judgment the creation of thumbnails by the search engine Arriba to be legally admissible.
The court argued that Arriba’s thumbnail images served the transformative purpose since
it improved access to information and did not just portray Kelly’s original full-size images
(Ott, 2007, p. 566). A more recent case is Field v. Google (see Na, 2006).
28See Ott (2007, p. 567), Lichtman (2008, pp. 65 et seq.), and Proskine (2006, p. 227).
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to harm the right holder since a displaying of snippets of a book does not
substitute a purchased full-text version.29
In this respect, Section 7.2(b)(iv) of the ASA explicitly stresses that “the
[finding] tools and generated information will not permit users to read or
view any material from the LDC30 [. . . ], except that such users may read or
view Front Matter Display and, in response to a search request, a limited
number of Snippets for the purpose of enabling the user to verify which
Book has been identified”. The project generates additional social welfare
as it adds a new functionality to the protected works. Users will be able to
locate particular books and book contents containing the search term and
hence supporting decision-making according to the user’s interest. Google’s
search engine may assist in the matching of demand and supply, and hence
increase book revenues. Therefore, the project appears to exhibit a highly
transformative use, countervailing its commercial character.
The nature of the copyrighted work is related to the issue of the creativity
of a work. Since the general intention of copyright is to reward creativity
and innovation, works exhibiting greater creativity “are closer to the core
of intended copyright protection” (Campbell, 1994, p. 586) than those ex-
hibiting less creativity.31 As a result, a fair use is required to distinguish
between highly creative works like fictional novels and less creative works
like biographies.32
29Hausman and Sidak (2009) argue that Google’s platform for accessing books eventually
introduces an extraordinary new product. In particular, they argue that the ability to
make all books around the world searchable and accessible will facilitate research and
hence the creation of subsequent works.
30LDC means “Library Digital Copy”. See ASA, Section 1.81.
31See also Lichtman (2008, p. 65).
32Note that copyright only protects the expression of facts, but not the facts themselves
(Na, 2006, p. 441). A biography, chronologically reflecting the facts of a person’s life, is
of less creativity as a purely fictional novel that arises from its author’s creative ability.
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Another aspect with regard to the nature of the copyrighted work is the
availability of an original work to the public. A distinction between commer-
cially available (in-print) and commercially unavailable (out-of-print) works
is frequently applied by the courts. As Google’s Library Project scans en-
tire library collections, it does not distinguish according to a work’s level
of creativity.33 In addition, commercially available books are not generally
excluded from digitization. Thus, along both dimensions, Google may even-
tually infringe copyright law unless its Library Program is justified by fair
use. However, the fact that Google’s focus is on digitizing particularly out-
of-print works may justify a fair use. In addition, Google chooses the Display
or No-Display classification34 subject of whether or not a book is determined
as being in-print or out-of-print. In this context, the ASA has changed the
basis for this determination. Following Section 3.2(d)(i) of the ASA, Google
“shall use commercially reasonable eﬀorts to determine whether a book is
Commercially available or is not Commercially Available using a method-
ology reasonably agreed to by Google and the Registry.”35 Notably, the
Library Program appears to predominantly involve non-fictional works as
Google primarily scans books from university libraries. Thus, the content
to be digitized should be labeled factual material, i.e. non-fictional works,
as opposed to creative fictional works (Varian, 2006a, p. 9). In total, the
court may weigh this factor, at most, slightly against Google.36
33However, attachment F of the ASA provides a list of fictional genres — in particular
anthologies, poetry collections and short stories — where No Preview (ASA, Section 1.92
and Section 4.3(b)(ii)) is granted. Furthermore, “for Fiction, Google will block the final
five percent (5%) of the Book’s pages (or a minimum of the final fifteen (15) pages in the
book.”(ASA, Section 4.3(b)(i)(1)). This second aspect especially provides Google with a
bargaining chip for the third factor of the fair use analysis.
34See ASA, Section 3.2.
35In particular, Google “will use third-party databases from a range of United States, Cana-
dian, United Kingdom, and Australian sources that can be obtained on fair and commer-
cially reasonable terms.”(ASA, Section 3.2(d)(i)).
36See Na (2006, pp. 441 et seq.), Ott (2007, p. 568), and Lichtman (2008, pp. 66 et seq.).
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However, changes made in the ASA may even shift this issue towards a
more neutral assessment of factor two in the fair use analysis. In terms
of the amount and substantiality of the portion used, two aspects seem
relevant: First, the degree to which a work has been copied (i.e. the number
of pages), and second, the relevance of the copied fraction in relation to the
complete work. As a general rule and proxy, one can say that the greater the
amount of copied material, the less likely is a possible justification by fair
use. Nonetheless, copying a complete work does not preclude fair use nor
does a decrease in the degree of copied material automatically make a fair
use more likely (Lichtman, 2008, p. 67). In this context, for instance, the
copied excerpts may be of most interest to the reader (e.g. the last chapter
of a novel).
As far as the Library Project is concerned, Google needs to digitize the
book content entirely to make the information searchable.37 Hence, the
fraction copied is 100 percent. Nevertheless, Google’s search engine will only
display snippets containing the search term. The user will only receive a first
impression that establishes the basis for the user’s decision in acquiring the
searched information.38 In addition, the settlement contains a “20-Percent-
Rule” for the Standard Preview. That is, Google may display up to 20
percent of a book but limited to an amount of five adjacent pages at a
time.39 For works of fiction, Google blocks the final five percent of each
book or a minimum of at least fifteen pages. This aspect seems particularly
relevant for novels as the conclusion of a book is typically of highest interests
to the reader. Consequently, the third factor might be considered as rather
neutral in justifying a fair use by the ASA.
37See Ott (2007, p. 568), Lichtman (2008, p. 67), and Travis (2009, p. 129).
38See ASA, Section 7.2(b)(iv).
39See ASA, Section 4.3(b)(i)(1).
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The fourth factor explicitly listed in 17 U.S.C. §107 addresses the expected
eﬀect of the use upon the potential market. The intention underlying this
consideration is that the new (transformed) product should not narrow the
(potential) market of the right holder (Ott, 2007, p. 568). The court will
have to consider the eﬀects of the transformed product on the value of the
protected work since copyright intends to create a value for creative works
through providing incentives for their provision by granting an exclusive
right to the creator. As far as the potential market is concerned, the court
will as well consider potential eﬀects on the market for derivative works
(Hanratty, 2005). Accordingly, the fourth factor is closely connected to the
question of a transformative use since a meaningfully distinct transformed
product is less likely to harm the right holder and hence to lower the market
value. In the case of Google, the snippets are not likely to substitute the
original work and therefore are not likely to present a meaningful threat to
the value of existing works. Nevertheless, critics fear the threat that the
digitized copies can leak out because Google does not store the snippets but
the full text version of each book in their databases.40 Computer hackers
could eventually see Google’s security precautions as a challenge to hack the
database, inducing a severe threat to the exclusive rights of authors.41
Despite the potential risks, one can argue that the Library Program may
even facilitate a potential increase in the market value of existing and deriv-
ative works since the “buy the full text version” link is likely to accelerate
book sales and access to information. Whether this issue weighs in favor of
Google or the plaintiﬀs will depend on the court’s definition of the existing
40See Samuelson (2010b, p. 1368), Band (2006, p. 10), and Lichtman (2008, p. 69).
41See Ott (2007, p. 568) on this point. This critique does not necessarily account for
Google’s attempts only. The technological development in general has set the institutional
framework in this rapidly changing and challenging environment. Everyone equipped with
a scanner may be able to impose a threat to the exclusive rights of authors and publishers.
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and potential market and if the redistribution of cash flows by the BRR
allows for a compensation of the potential risks of hacked databases.42
A balancing of the pros and cons to factor four may, at the most, result in a
slightly negative judgment towards Google’s use. To sum up, the application
of the four statutory factors explicitly listed in 17 U.S.C. §107 — used to
clarify whether Google’s use is to the left or to the right of S∗ in Figure 2 —
shows that there will be no uniform conclusion. In particular, the court will
have to balance the benefits and costs of a possible fair use judgment.43
Table 1 summarizes the conclusions drawn from each factor of the “fair-
use” analysis.
TABLE 1: A “Fair Use” Analysis of the Google Book Search Settlement
Statutory Factors of a “Fair Use” Analysis Assessment
1 The purpose and character of the use (+)∗
2 The nature of the copyrighted works (0/−)∗∗
3 The amount and substantiality of the portion used (0)
4 The eﬀect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work
(0/−)
* Note that the positive eﬀects of a transformative use may counterveil the commercial
character of the use
** The Ammended Settlement Agreement may forward a rather neutral assessment of
factor 2
The final judgment on the fair or unfair use of copyrighted works by
Google will be a matter of how one weighs the arguments against each
other. While the purpose and character of the use may weigh the court’s
42See Ott (2007, p. 568), Na (2006, pp. 443 et seq.), and Lichtman (2008, pp. 67 et seq.).
43Note that in Harper & Row. v. Nation Enterprises the US Supreme Court highlighted the
fourth factor as the “single most important element of [the] fair use”analysis ((Cf. Harper
& Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)). However, in Campbell v. Acuﬀ-Rose
Music, Inc. the Supreme Court more recently argued that “the four statutory factors are
to be explored, and the results weighed together”, revealing the need to balance all pros
and cons of a possible fair use argumentation (Cf. Campbell, aka Skyywalker et al. v.
Acuﬀ-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)).
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judgment rather in favor of Google (+), the assessment of the factors two
and four may, at most, be slightly against (-) or even neutral (o) towards
the fair use argument. However, the ASA may shift the judgment more in
favor of Google’s fair use argumentation.
3.1.3. Additional Considerations. Despite the equal relevance of all four fac-
tors explicitly listed in 17 U.S.C. §107, the list is not exhaustive. That is,
the court may consider additional aspects that are decisive in the particular
case to come to a final conclusion upon the question whether the Library
Program within the amended Google Book Search Settlement constitutes a
fair use of copyright protected works.
From an economist’s perspective, at least three additional aspects may
be considered. First, the project benefits the right holders of the digitized
works since an integration of a “Buy this book” link will likely accelerate
book sales and hence authors’ revenues by an increase in the demand for
their works (Lichtman, 2008, p. 72; Band, 2006, p. 12). In addition,
Google makes books searchable and creates a basis for potential buyers to
seek information as to whether a book is of interest for them. The success
of Amazon’s “Look Inside” functionality, with an increase of sales by 15
percent, (Varian, 2006a, p. 6) may even support this hypothesis. In contrast
to Amazon, however, Google oﬀers the additional opportunity to find a book
of interest, subject to a search term that is typed in by the user. Thus, a
user will not have to know whether a book is of interest beforehand. The
Google Project may then be of particular relevance for books that serve a
niche market since the opportunities of a search engine may create an initial
signal to a potential consumer (Lichtman, 2008, p. 71). Regarding the
great amount of “out-of-print” and orphan works, Google’s search engine
will initially create a new market and hence expectations to gain revenues
for their authors. Consequently, the project will help to lower information
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costs on the demand side and likely increase book sales. In this respect, it
is important to note that many publishers and authors participate in the
Partner Program. This gives the impression that providing partial access
to their books via the internet has a positive eﬀect on sales. There is no
reason to believe that this does not apply to the right holders in the Library
Program.
Second, the opt-out opportunity for copyright holders not interested in
participating in the project is eﬃcient from a transaction cost perspective.44
Regarding an opt-in model, the parties involved would face high costs for
finding each other in a first step and then negotiating a contract face-to-face
in a second step. The former cost type is particularly relevant for the large
number of orphan works involved in the project. George (2002) emphasizes
the problems associated with the process of finding and allocating right
holders of orphan works. From this perspective, the resolute approach to
opt books out instead of opting them in may as well be a low-cost way of
forcing an allocation of the right holders to their works.45
Third, Google’s recent move via the ASA to extend the responsibilities
for the BRR and to create the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary has added one
important issue. The BRR establishes a public database of right holders in
claimed books and actively takes eﬀorts to search for right holders of or-
phan works.46 The number of orphan works will, therefore, likely decrease
in the future. The function of the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary should be
seen in its independent character to oversee the license fees that are collected
by the BRR. The ASA seeks to provide a credible commitment regarding
44Varian (2006b) argues that an opt-in solution would not be feasible in the context of
orphan works. He argues that, from the perspective of transaction cost economics, the
question should not be who is able to identify the right holders of orphan works, but
who exhibits the lowest identification costs. See also Gordon (1982, pp. 1618 et seq.) on
market failure associated with prohibitive transaction costs of licensing copyrighted works
as a justification for the fair use doctrine.
45This argument seems to be particularly true as the BRR creates incentives for registry.
46See ASA, Sections 6.1(c) and 6.3(a)(i).
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Google’s use of unclaimed funds to actively locate right holders and distrib-
ute unclaimed funds to literacy-based charities.47 In conclusion, our analysis
promotes the opinion that — from a copyright perspective — the settlement
between the Authors Guild, the Association of American Publishers, and
Google may be met with approval as it appears to be beneficial to all par-
ties involved — the consumers, the right holders (authors and publishers),
and Google. Google’s response to emerging concerns by filing an amended
version of the settlement may eventually even strengthen a fair use argu-
mentation. Last but not least, the Google Book Search Project may provide
a solution to the unsolved dilemma of orphan works — a problem that Con-
gress has repeatedly tried but failed to address in the history of legislative
eﬀorts (Ji, 2010, p. 34).
3.2. A Competition Policy Perspective. The Google Book Search Set-
tlement not only raises concerns from copyright perspective. Recently,
Picker (2009) and Grimmelmann (2009a, 2009b) have promoted a discus-
sion as to whether the class action settlement poses an antitrust threat that
should be an issue of a close investigation. In particular, some concern has
arisen that the settlement could facilitate a setting of an orphan works mo-
nopoly and could pose an antitrust threat by the creation of the BRR as a
cartel of authors and publishers.
3.2.1. Class Action and Cartelization. Particularly the creation of the BRR
— as a new collecting society and intermediary between Google and the right
holders — has raised antitrust concerns. Several scholars have claimed that
the BRR may eventually help to leverage Google’s market dominance for
47In particular, Section 6.3(a)(i)(2) constitutes that the BRR may use up to 25 percent of
unclaimed funds after five years to locate right holders of orphan works. Beginning ten
years after the eﬀective date, unclaimed funds “should be distributed to literacy-based
charities in each such country that directly or indirectly benefit the Rightsholders and the
reading public.”(ASA, Section 6.3(a)(i)(3)).
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search engines to the market of digital books by creating an exclusive joint
venture between Google and right holders.
In September 2009, the online bookseller Amazon filed a formal objection
claiming that the BRR was likely to induce a cartel of authors and pub-
lishers with a potential to raise book prices and reduce output.48 Amazon
argued that the creation of the BRR would be detrimental to consumers
and future right holders, who would have to compete with the predominant
cartel members.49
Grimmelmann (2009a) argues that the settlement will create a central-
ized collecting society which exhibits a substantial power to negotiate on
behalf of the class of right holders. That is, the BRR will create the base-
line for collective action and have a broad discretion to even work out a
pricing algorithm for dividing the revenues from integrated advertisements
and e-commerce activities. Furthermore, the BRR will be empowered to
negotiate the terms and conditions of potential new revenue models, such as
file downloads (limited to books that are not commercially available), print-
on-demand and consumer subscription.50 Note, however, that at launch
Google is likely to only use institutional subscriptions and consumer pur-
chase models (Fraser, 2010, p. 7). Picker (2009) takes such apprehension
to the extreme as he views Google as an agent acting on behalf of right
holders that has the power to set the prices for online access to consumers
and hence to engage in price discriminating practices. He also raises con-
cerns that both active individual right holders as well as the BRR would
48Amazon.com Objection to Proposed Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc. vs. Google Inc.,
S.D.N.Y. Case No.05 CV 8136-DC, on pp. 18 et seq. (1 September 2009).
49Amazon.com Objection to Proposed Settlement, pp. 15 et seq. See also http://www.
istockanalyst.com/article/viewarticle/articleid/3457080 (last visited 16 Septem-
ber 2010). However, U.S. District Judge Denny Chin rejected Amazon’s objection.
50ASA, Section 4.7. See also Grimmelmann (2009a, p. 13), Wang (2010, p. 3), and Picker
(2009, p. 390).
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have little incentives to grant Google’s rivals licenses of claimed and orphan
works (Picker, 2009, p. 408).
Nevertheless, it is important to note that right holders and the BRR
as upstream suppliers would have incentives to license a Google rival if it
charges a lower distribution markup than Google and distributes the work
more eﬃciently (Elhauge, 2010, p. 12). Furthermore, the ASA prescribes
that the BRR shall, at the request of right holders, facilitate the distribution
of works through alternative licenses for consumer purchase such as the
Creative Commons license.51
As for orphan works, the Google Books Search service “will create all
value above the value that consumers derive from having physical access to
orphan books” (Hausman and Sidak, 2009, p. 423). This is likely to lead
to an increase in consumer welfare in this regard. Besides, Google creates
the institutional subscription, which is to be set at competitive market rates
under the amended settlement. It will allow institutions to view all books
included in the subscription upon the permission of the right holders and
all thus far commercially unavailable books that have been made available
for purchase under the amended settlement (Elhauge, 2010, p. 6). Thereby,
Google would add a new market option, which potentially increases con-
sumer welfare.
Against this background, a closer investigation of the ASA and, in par-
ticular, of the design of the BRR and the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary may
weaken some of the antitrust concerns. First, the establishment of the BRR
can be seen as an essential step in saving transaction costs from otherwise
one-to-one negotiations and in permitting more transactions to occur as it
establishes a public database of right holders in claimed books and finances
a search for right holders of orphan works (Elhauge, 2010, pp. 4 et seq.).
51See ASA, Sections 1.44 and 4.2(a)(i).
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It thus makes identification of right holders of in-copyright books and the
licensing of orphan works easier (Besen, Kirby and Salop, 1992, pp. 383 et
seq. and Fraser, 2010, p. 6). It is also likely to decrease the number of
orphan works in the future by gathering and providing precise information
about right holders (Hausman and Sidak, 2009, p. 433). Also, the amended
settlement requires the independent Unclaimed Works Fiduciary to oversee
the license fees collected for unclaimed works, to use up to 25 percent of
unclaimed funds to locate right holders, and to distribute unclaimed funds
held at least 10 years to literacy-based charities.52 In this light, it is rec-
ommended that the court conditions the acceptance of the ASA subject to
the work of the BRR and the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary “to set standards
designed to further reduce the volume of unclaimed works”.53 Nevertheless,
by acting on behalf of all right holders, the BRR eventually establishes an
institutional framework that may facilitate a coordination of authors’ and
publishers’ interests. A deeper analysis hence raises questions regarding the
conditions and determinants for cartel stability.
In this context, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines — provided by the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission — may provide a
good guide for our analysis.54 (19 August 2010). Three crucial conditions
abound that facilitate a successful coordinated interaction: First, an agree-
ment that reaches terms of coordination that are profitable to the firms,
preventing the cartel members from defection. Second, a mechanism or con-
ditions that allow for a detection of deviant behavior of a member. Third, an
52See ASA, Sections 6.1(c) and 6.3(a)(i).
53Cf. United States of America Regarding Proposed Amended Settlement Agreement, The
Author’s Guild, et. al. v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. 4 February 2010), p.
24.
54Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
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eﬀective sanctioning mechanism which makes it more profitable to cooperate
than to pursue short-term profits from deviation.55
In addition, several determinants and market conditions may help to as-
sess the proposed eﬀects on cartel stability, i.e. the number of firms in the
market, the heterogeneity of products, etc.56 As a general rule, the smaller
the number of market actors and the more homogeneous their products, the
easier it is to coordinate the terms and parameters agreed on (Motta, 2004,
pp. 142 et seq.). It has been argued that the BRR eventually provides an
institutional framework for an agreement on the terms that are subject to
a registration (Picker, 2009). Besides, by giving each right holder the right
to opt out, they are eventually provided with the opportunity to choose
the exit option. However, especially for the great number of commercially
unavailable works, this option may not be profitable to firms since it is the
“googlization” that actually establishes a market for these books in the first
place. The possible threat of an alleged cartel member choosing the exit
option may, therefore, lack credibility. Furthermore, this option is by defini-
tion irrelevant in the case of unclaimed works for which right holders remain
unknown. However, for orphan works and works whose right holders choose
not to set a price, the ASA requires Google to use a pricing algorithm that
replicates a competitive Nash-Bertrand market outcome.57 As this pricing
algorithm is subject to inspection, a coordinated increase in prices of such
works may not be feasible. Weighing these arguments, one may assert that
the first condition to facilitate a successful coordinated interaction may only
be satisfied for claimed, commercially unavailable works and works whose
55Motta (2004), p. 139. Also, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (19 August, 2010), pp. 24 et seq..
56Other determinants to assess whether a cartel is likely to result in a stable coordination
equilibrium are, for instance, market entry barriers, the frequency of interaction, market
transparency and demand characteristics (Van den Bergh and Camesasca, 2006, pp. 368
et seq.).
57We will analyze this aspect in more detail in section 3.2.2.
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right holders explicitly choose to set a price. However, both latter conditions
are hardly satisfied for the following reasons. First, the number of books
covered by the settlement — and hence the group of right holders that would
have to be coordinated — is extremely large, making it diﬃcult to detect
deviant behavior of a member (Wang, 2010, p. 4). Second, right holders
of claimed commercially available in-copyright books are free to set their
own prices for sale through Google or can sell their books through Google’s
rivals. This will make it diﬃcult for the BRR to control prices (Elhauge,
2010, pp. 3 et seq. and Wang, 2010, p. 4). Third, the book market is very
heterogeneous. A novel is by its very nature a singular good. One novel
will be no perfect substitute for another novel. This holds even more with
respect to diﬀerent genres of books. As a result, the ability of right holders
to reach a stable cooperative equilibrium and to coordinate an increase in
book prices may be limited (Wang, 2010, p. 4). Nevertheless, as the BRR
negotiates on behalf of the whole class of registered right holders, awareness
with respect to the composition of the BRR is strongly required.58 In partic-
ular, owners of unregistered copyrights as well as potential future copyright
holders are excluded from the settlement. That is, not all interests of the
total class of authors and publishers are represented by the BRR. The most
immediate danger from this is that the BRR may negotiate terms at the
expense of unregistered right holders. It is, however, important to note that
the ASA requires the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary to independently repre-
sent the interests of right holders regarding the exploitation of unclaimed
58This follows from the nature of the legal concept of a class action. A class action allows
that questions of law — which might be relevant for a class of diﬀerent claimants — are
decided on uniformly and binding to all members of this class. A class action meanwhile
constitutes a special legal concept in US law. However, the question as to whether or
not the settlement is beyond the court’s authority is beyond the scope of this paper. See
Department of Justice (2010, p. 2), which states that the ASA “is an attempt to use the
class action mechanism to implement forward-looking business arrangements that go far
beyond the dispute before the Court in this litigation.”
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works.59 Finally, Grimmelmann (2009a) claims that the BRR should be re-
quired to represent any copyright holder. In addition, it should be ensured
that non-plaintiﬀ and future copyright holders receive contracts at the very
same (or better) conditions (Grimmelmann, 2009a, pp. 13 et seq.).
3.2.2. Market Power, Barriers to Entry, Pricing, and Access to Knowledge.
In addition to the antitrust concerns regarding the BRR, some scholars as
well as the Department of Justice fear a monopolization of the digital book
market by Google.60 They argue that, with respect to the large number of
orphan works, the settlement will provide Google with an exclusive right
and considerable freedom to set prices61 as well as terms for all commercial
services involved in the Book Search Project.
However, the simple fact that Google is the first to enter a new market
does not necessarily mean that Google will reach a monopoly position. In
competition law, a monopolistic position poses a severe threat to competi-
tion where there are significant barriers to entry. As a result, the analysis
focuses on the question whether the settlement helps to establish such bar-
riers to entry. Critics in this respect have seen the so-called “Most Favored
Nations” (MFN) clause as the most pressing problem of the settlement agree-
ment (Picker, 2009, pp. 400 et seq. and Grimmelmann, 2009a, p. 15). This
clause could have guaranteed Google that none of its competitors could gain
a competitive advantage within ten years of the settlement’s eﬀective date,
which could have resulted in less incentives to enter the market (Ji, 2010,
p. 15). The settlement could eventually have deterred market entry of po-
tential competitors such as Yahoo!, Microsoft, or Amazon. However, the
ASA has eliminated the MFN clause. More specifically, seeing as the ASA
59See ASA, Section 6.2(b)(iii).
60In particular, see Samuelson (2010a), Grimmelmann (2009a), Fraser (2010), and Depart-
ment of Justice (2009).
61Grimmelmann (2009a) emphasizes the threat of price discriminating practices on consumer
surplus.
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is non-exclusive,62 the BRR could produce a licensing deal with Google’s
rivals on better terms than Google gets. Furthermore, Google’s rivals may
license claimed books from the BRR and unclaimed books from the Un-
claimed Works Fiduciary63 “to the extent permitted by law”.64 In contrast
to Google, which bears the costs of scanning profitable as well as unprof-
itable books and the settlement cost, a follow-on competitor could make a
deal with the BRR and license only commercially profitable books for digital
use without bearing the cost of digitizing books and the settlement cost. A
Google rival may, therefore, free ride on Google’s upfront investment in the
digitization of books. In the long-run, books digitized by Google that are
currently copyright protected will go out of copyright and will then be fully
available to Google’s rivals without incurring cost of digitization. Google’s
rivals may also benefit from a facilitated determination of the value of dig-
ital books as the amended settlement may help to reveal the right holders’
sales volumes and thus the extent of buyer demand (Elhauge, 2010, p. 2).
As the BRR will use settlement funds to attempt to locate right holders of
orphan works, Google’s rivals may also benefit from lower search costs.65 It
is, therefore, harder to accuse Google of possessing market power by estab-
lishing barriers to entry (Elhauge, 2010, pp. 7 et seq.). The establishment of
the BRR and the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary as required in the ASA may
even result in lower barriers to entry for Google’s rivals, for instance, by
lowering digitization cost barriers and costs of identifying out-of-copyright
works and valuing digital books (Elhauge, 2010, pp. 9 et seq.). Further-
more, Google already oﬀers out-of-copyright books to users of the Apple’s
iPhone, Sony’s Reader, and the Android mobile (Fraser, 2010, p. 8).
62See ASA, Sections 2.4 and 3.1(a).
63See ASA, Section 6.2(b)(iii).
64See ASA, Section 6.2(b)(i). See Elhauge (2010), p. 5.
65See ASA, Section 6.1(c).
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However, it could be asked whether the Google Book Search service has
the characteristics of a natural monopoly. The digital book market can be
characterized by means of a large fixed cost for the creation of a database of
digital books, high economies of scale and positive network eﬀects.66 Google,
as a first mover in the digital book market, has already laid out significant
irreversible upfront investments in digitizing books and negotiating the set-
tlement. The marginal costs of providing its service, however, are likely to
approximate zero once the settlement is approved. Furthermore, it can be
argued that Google alone has the resources to create a database for digital
books on a massive scale (Darnton, 2009). As such, the picture of a nat-
ural monopoly could be drawn from an economic perspective. The database
may be considered as an essential facility that is necessary for all partici-
pants to operate in the digital books industry (Motta, 2004, p. 66). It may
be reasonable to have a monopoly on digital databases and be even socially
desirable to avoid additional social costs for the provision of the very same
good. Hence, one could make the case for having only one supplier of such
a database if the saved costs of duplication associated with the absence of a
competing database more than outweigh the value of competition associated
with an additional database. This, however, is more likely to be the case
if the pricing algorithm for settlement controlled prices successfully mim-
ics the outcome under competition as the additional procompetitive eﬀect
associated with a second database would be lower in this case.
In addition, it might be better to have only one supplier — realizing the
social benefits of such a search engine — than having none. Nevertheless,
66See Grimmelmann (2009a), p. 14 and Picker (2009), pp. 400 et seq.. For instance,
positive network eﬀects may arise as right holders of unclaimed works are more inclined
to register when there are more users of the Google Books database. Also, right holders
of claimed works may be less inclined to opt-out when more individuals use the Google
Books database. Furthermore, more individuals may use it as soon as more books are
available for search and purchase, which is the case when more right holders register their
works.
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consciousness of Google’s resulting market position is strongly needed. In
this respect, the essential facilities doctrine67 and particularly the decision
of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in MCI v. AT&T may provide a
valid guide for our analysis.68 The Court stated that there were “four ele-
ments necessary to establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine:
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s in-
ability to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential facility; (3) the
denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of
providing the facility.”69 The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of
Verizon v. Trinko added another condition: (5) a court must prove absence
of regulatory oversight with the power to compel access.70
As for the first condition, Google arguably is a monopolist in the digital
books market and to a significant degree — indirectly via the BRR — in
control of the database (Samuelson, 2010a; Grimmelmann, 2009a; Fraser,
2010). Condition (1) might therefore be satisfied.
As for the second condition, if it is reasonable for competitors such as
Amazon, Yahoo! or Microsoft to create their own databases, then there is
no monopolization. One may argue that it is practically possible for com-
petitors to create their own database by negotiating with single right hold-
ers.71 Prohibitively high transactions cost of one-to-one negotiations with
hundreds of thousands of right holders may deter rivals to create a compara-
ble database. The second condition might therefore also be satisfied because
67See Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon (2005, pp. 323 et seq.). For a critique of the essential
facilities doctrine, see Areeda and Hovenkamp (2008, §7.06 b). The question, however,
as to whether the essential facilities doctrine should generally be abandoned — as several
commentators have argued — is beyond the scope of this paper.
68MCI Communications Co. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982).
69MCI Communications Co. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982), at 1132-33. See
Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks (2002, pp. 448 et seq.).
70See Verizon Communications v. Law Oﬃces of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
71Alternatively, Google’s rivals may digitize books without right holders’ permission in the
hope that a similar class action lawsuit may be settled on terms comparable to the ASA.
However, Department of Justice (2010, p. 21), states that this suggestion “is poor public
policy and not something the antitrust laws require a competitor to do.”
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the creation of a competing database would be prohibitively expensive when
rivals are forced to negotiate with right holders on a one-to-one basis.
The third condition would require Google to deny the commercial usage
of the database to rivals such as Amazon, Microsoft or Yahoo!. As men-
tioned earlier, Google’s rivals may license claimed books from the BRR and
unclaimed books from the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary to the extent per-
mitted by law. Provided that Google’s rivals can use the database through
licensing agreements with the BRR, condition (3) is hardly satisfied.
Consider now the fourth condition. Arguably, it is technically feasible for
Google to provide rivals with access to the database. Also, sharing the data-
base is not likely to inhibit Google from serving its customers adequately
(Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, 2002, p. 450). But are there legitimate
business rationales for Google to refuse commercial usage of the database
by rivals? (Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon, 2005, p. 323). For instance, one
could argue that Google should be able to recover some of its sunk invest-
ment in scanning books.72 Also, would Google have created the database,
which is likely to benefit consumers, if it had known that it would be re-
quired to share it?73 Against this background, it appears reasonable to cast
doubt on whether condition (4) is satisfied.
72This is a common rationale for the legitimate possession of temporary monopoly power in
industries with high upfront investments such as the pharmaceutical industry. If expected
future profits are too low, producers would ex ante not be willing to invest in R&D in the
first place. See Supreme Court in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Oﬃces of Curtis
V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), p. 7: “The mere possession of monopoly power, and
the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important
element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly price at least for
a short period is what attracts business acumen in the first place; it induces risk taking
that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate,
the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by
an element of anticompetitive conduct.”
73See Areeda (1989, p. 851), who states that “the justification for refusing to share a
research laboratory does not focus on the practical infeasibility of letting another use
the laboratory, but on the general concern that the defendant would never have built a
laboratory of that size and character in the first place if he had known that he would be
required to share it. Required sharing discourages building facilities such as this, even
though they benefit consumers.”
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To sum up, the analysis of the four conditions set forth in MCI v. AT&T
leads us to the conclusion that antitrust liability may not be established
under the essential facilities doctrine. Taking the fifth condition added in
Verizon v. Trinko into account could confirm this impression (Samuelson,
2010a; Grimmelmann, 2009a; Fraser, 2010). Nevertheless, even though li-
ability may not be established under the essential facilities doctrine, the
antitrust authorities will still have to ensure that Google does not leverage
its market dominance to up- or downstream markets.74 In doing so, compul-
sory licensing, for example, may be required. In reference to the downsides
of compulsory licensing,75 however, the literature emphasizes the imposition
of a consent decree as a promising alternative in thinking antitrust policy
in the case of Google’s monopoly.76 As compared to compulsory licensing,
Ji (2010) stresses that a consent decree with a rate-setting court provision
would be a more eﬃcient form of liability for monopoly regulation. In par-
ticular, a consent decree crafted in the fashion of the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) would allow courts to act
as quasi-regulators, providing an eﬃcient mechanism design in bargaining
reasonable and non-discriminatory77 licensee fees for third parties (Ji, 2010,
pp. 33 et seq. and Crane, 2009, pp. 307). As for settlement controlled
prices, the ASA does not provide a “carte blanche” for setting book prices,
nor does it enable gaining control over the amount of accessible copies. It
rather requires Google to set a price using a competition-mimicking pricing
74For instance, one may consider the integrated links to online book stores. In this regard,
it will have to be ensured that Google does not take advantage of his dominant market
position.
75See Merges (1996, pp. 1376 et seq.) on the downsides of compulsory licensing in a
multimedia context.
76See Ji (2010, pp. 23 et seq.), Grimmelmann (2009a, p. 13), and Grimmelmann (2009b,
pp. 13 et seq.). Crane (2009) provides a general perspective regarding the eﬀectiveness of
a consent decree.
77See Frischmann and Weber Waller (2008, pp. 36 et seq.) on licensing in the context of
the essential facilities doctrine.
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algorithm for orphan books and for books whose right holders choose not to
set a price.78
For claimed, commercially unavailable in-copyright books,79 however, right
holders can sell their books through Google’s rivals or set their own prices for
sale through Google (Elhauge, 2010, pp. 3 et seq.). For instance, according
to the ASA, right holders may even oﬀer their books for free.80
As far as prices of out-of print books go, note that consumers of such
works benefit from Google Book Search. The search engine reduces the
transactions costs of finding out-of-print books and therefore it also reduces
the prices of such works. Finally, note that alternative sources of supply,
such as document delivery services, will still be accessible. The Google Book
Search program will rather increase access to books by providing additional
free public access services. For instance, Google may provide one computer
terminal with free access to the collection of works for every four thousand
full-time students of higher education institutions in the United States81 as
well as one terminal per building of each public library.82
3.3. Policy Implications. From a copyright perspective, the court will
have to approach the question as to whether the Google Book Search Set-
tlement is either a fair use or an infringement of copyright.83 Our analysis
78See ASA, Sections 4.2(b)(i)(2), 4.2(c)(ii)(2), and 4.2(c)(iii).
79Commercially unavailable books are in-copyright books that are not oﬀered for sale as
digital copy or in print.
80See ASA, Section 4.2(b)(i)(1). This option might be particularly attractive for academics
who are likely to be more interested in a maximum distribution and readership of their
works than in direct financial gains. See Shavell (2010) as well as Feess and Scheufen
(2011). See also Müller-Langer and Watt (2010) for an analysis of the potential eﬀects on
universities if copyright for academic works were abolished.
81The number of computer terminals depends on the Carnegie Classification of Institutions
of Higher Education. For higher education institutions that qualify (do not qualify) “as
Associate’s Colleges”, Google may provide one terminal per four (ten) thousand full-time
students, according to ASA, Sections 4.8(a)(i)(1) and 4.8(a)(i)(2), respectively.
82See ASA, Section 4.8(a)(i)(3).
83Note that an application of the “fair-use” doctrine is only a subject matter of U.S. copy-
right law. In German copyright law, the Book Search project would infringe the copyright
of the particular authors and publishers. The competence of U.S. national law follows from
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of the “fair use” argument reveals a need to balance the social benefits and
costs assigned to the Library Program. Particularly the first statutory factor
of the analysis — the purpose and character of the use — weighs the judg-
ment in favor of a fair use. Accordingly, Google’s approach constitutes a
transformative use for two reasons. First, Google creates a product that is
meaningfully distinct from the original work and hence is not likely to harm
the right holder since a displaying of snippets of a book is no substitute
for a purchased, full-text version. Second, the project generates additional
social welfare as it adds a new functionality to the protected works. Nev-
ertheless, as the results of the analysis of all four statutory factors listed
under 17 U.S.C. §107 are to be weighed together,84 a final judgment is com-
plex. However, the ASA has shifted the final judgment in favor of a fair use
argumentation.
Some additional considerations may help in the assessment. Arguments
from transaction cost and welfare economics may push our qualitative con-
clusions in the direction of a fair use. The project will especially benefit
authors since the demand for books is likely to increase due to a decrease in
information costs on the demand side.85 This argument will be particularly
true for authors of formerly out-of-print works. Google will create a new
market for these works. It is also important to note that consumers of out-
of-print works will benefit from lower transaction costs of finding such works.
In addition, the provided opt-out strategy is eﬃcient from the transaction
costs perspective. Especially considering the large number of orphan works,
the opting out of books instead of opting them in will be the only way to
the “lex loci protectionis” principle. See Ott (2007) on this point. Besides, the amended
settlement induced changes to the international scope towards US works.
84See footnote 43.
85Google’s platform will create a fundament to make book content accessible and searchable.
Accordingly, the search engine will aﬀect the decision making of potential readers, as it
enables them to locate relevant information by the typing of a search term.
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force an eﬃcient allocation of right holders to their works.86 In addition, the
creation of the BRR will ensure that authors and publishers will participate
in the revenues gained. Finally, Google is about to provide a reasonable
solution to the orphan works dilemma.
In conclusion, copyright policy may be advised to allow for a “fair-use”
argumentation. As for competition policy, the conclusions made reveal a
need to investigate the class action settlement in more detail. In particular,
however, some of the arguments made by Grimmelmann (2009a, 2009b),
Picker (2009) and Samuelson (2010a) — who strongly advocate a modification
or even rejection of the settlement — were weakened. Accordingly, a cartel of
authors and publishers using the BRR to coordinate their prices and other
market parameters is rather unlikely due to the market conditions. Apart
from that, Google’s introduction of the Unclaimed Books Fiduciary as an
independent monitoring agency will ease some of the concerns.
Nevertheless, some modifications — especially with respect to the compo-
sition of the BRR — will be required. From a consumer perspective, it is
essential that Google’s pricing algorithm eﬀectively mimics a competitive
Nash-Bertrand market outcome. We therefore recommend post-settlement
third-party oversight and scrutiny in this regard as an important safeguard
in order to ensure the pricing algorithm’s adherence to competitive pricing.
4. A Critical Perspective
The analysis of the Amended Google Book Search Settlement and the
Library Program still leaves us with several questions to be addressed. In
particular, economists will have to forward a more economic approach to
balance all associated benefits and costs in the context of a comprehensive
86It is, however, important to note that the Statement of Interest of the United States of
America Regarding Proposed Amended Settlement Agreement, The Author’s Guild, et.
al. v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. 4 February 2010), p. 25, remains to favor
an opt-in regime.
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welfare analysis. In this context, Google’s platform is expected to revolu-
tionize information flows and hence also the creation of future innovation.
Thus, the eﬀects of the settlement on the creation of derivative and subse-
quent works will have to be considered.
In addition, several aspects beyond the dimensions of copyright law and
competition policy have been neglected. First, technological aspects will
have to be considered. How secure is Google’s database against the threat
of hackers? In this context, particularly Google’s argument to allow for a
display of maximum 20 percent of book content may eventually be restricted
in regard to its technical implementation. The “fair use” defense would fall
with the technical vulnerability of Google’s database.
Furthermore, Ott (2007) criticizes the quality of Google’s scanning. He
argues that Google seeks a high quantity instead of a high quality in its
scanning process. Finally, a legitimation of the settlement would also raise
concerns of cultural and moral science. As such, the eﬀects of a “googlization
of everything” in society (Vaidhyanathan, 2009) will have to be discussed.
Moreover, the settlement would discriminate against lawful competitors of
Google. While other initiatives that seek for an explicit permission of the
right holder of a work actually follow the requirements provided by law,
Google’s thrust forward may be rewarded by the class action settlement.
5. A Note on Judge Chin’s Decision
The very recent proceedings resulted in a (first) decision on the pending
litigation process. On March 22, 2011, judge Denny Chin issued his order in
The Authors Guild et al. v. Google, Inc. (05 Civ. 8136 (DC)) rejecting the
GBS class action settlement (henceforth, Chin, 2011).87 Following rule 23 of
87The statement of Judge Denny Chin can be found at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
googlebooksopinion.pdf (visited 23 March 2011).
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure he concludes that the proposed settle-
ment (ASA) “is not fair, adequate and reasonable” (Chin, 2011, p. 45). In
particular, he argues that the ASA goes too far as it would grant Google a
significant advantage over other competitors while rewarding Google for en-
gaging in wholesale copying of copyrighted works without permission (Chin,
2011, pp. 1 et seq.). In reviewing the amended deal and more than 500
submissions commenting on the ASA and its original version, Judge Chin
shares concerns in copyright and antitrust issues. In addition, questions re-
garding the guardianship over orphan works as well as international concerns
may advance the argument that this matter should be assigned to Congress
rather than being crafted as a class action lawsuit (Chin, 2011, pp. 22 et
seq.).
At the end of his order Chin suggests that “many of the concerns raised
in the objections would be ameliorated if the ASA were converted from an
“opt-out” settlement to an “opt-in” settlement.” (Chin, 2011, p. 46).
Our analysis may push the conclusions reached by Judge Chin into debate
and eventually forward a claim for a more comprehensive theoretical as well
as empirical assessment.
In terms of copyright, Chin (2011) highlights primarily Google’s “opt-out”
policy as being most problematic against a fair use claim. The problem, how-
ever, may be rather twofold from a transaction cost perspective as it seems
necessary to distinguish non-orphan from orphan works. While in the first
case, a face-to-face negotiation with each right holder seems costly but fea-
sible, the latter may detract from the solution to the orphan works dilemma
as the right holders are by definition unknown. In this context, also George
(2002) emphasizes the problems associated with the process of finding and
allocating right holders of orphan works. Converting the settlement from
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an “opt-out” to an “out-in” principle as Chin (2011) suggests may conse-
quently raise the question on how to better serve the need for solving the
problem. Alternative initiatives like the Open Access or Creative Commons
movement may be limited in providing a promising solution as they fail to
provide a retro-digitization.88
From an antitrust perspective, Judge Chin mentions two main concerns
in his opinion on the proposed settlement. First, the ASA may grant Google
a monopoly over unclaimed works, in particular over orphan works (Chin,
2011, pp. 36 et seq.). Second, it may allow Google to control the search
market (Chin, 2011, pp. 37 et seq.). Consider the first antitrust concern.
From a consumer perspective, one may weigh the negative eﬀects of a de
facto monopoly over orphan works and the benefits of having digital access
to those works (see Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 of this article). The ASA may
be beneficial to consumers as the value consumers derive from digital access
to orphan works is likely to exceed the value from only having physical
access to those works.89 Also, the negative eﬀects of a monopoly of orphan
works associated with monopoly pricing can be reduced if explicit third-
party inspection ensures that Google’s pricing algorithm for orphan works
eﬀectively replicates a competitive market for books.90 This suggests that
a comprehensive welfare analysis is required to assess the first antitrust
concern mentioned by Judge Chin.
Secondly, the question whether the ASA would give Google control over
the search market relates to the question whether it would grant Google
a monopoly on digital books databases. We suggest an empirical analysis
of whether the saved costs of duplication associated with having only one
88In this context, Samuelson (2010c) argues that many academic authors would prefer that
orphan works should be treated on open access basis.
89For instance, Chin (2011) states on p. 3 that “books will become more accessible. Li-
braries, schools, researchers, and disadvantaged populations will gain access to far more
books”.
90See ASA, Sections 4.2(b)(i)(2), 4.2(c)(ii)(2), and 4.2(c)(iii).
44 FRANK MÜLLER-LANGER AND MARC SCHEUFEN
supplier of a digital books database may more than outweigh the value of
competition associated with an additional database. This is an empirical
question beyond the scope of this article, but certainly a promising avenue
for further research. An analysis of the welfare eﬀects of competing data-
bases for scientific works such as Lexis and Westlaw appears to be a natural
starting point. However, one may also take into consideration that addi-
tional procompetitive eﬀects associated with a rival digital books database
may be lower if the pricing algorithm for settlement controlled prices repli-
cates an outcome under competitive market conditions.
6. Conclusions
The amended Google Book Search Settlement may ensure the realization
of the social benefits associated with the implementation of Google’s search
engine. The class action settlement would entitle Google to continue with
the creation of a platform to make book content accessible and searchable
worldwide via the internet. Especially with regard to the large amount of
orphan works, the settlement would finally create a new market and hence
additional social surplus. In this respect, the settlement seems to be so-
cially desirable from a copyright law perspective. From a competition pol-
icy perspective, the conclusions made reveal a need to investigate the class
action settlement in more detail. However, some of the arguments made by
Grimmelmann (2009a, 2009b), Picker (2009) and Samuelson (2010a) — who
strongly advocate a modification or even rejection of the settlement — may
be weakened. Nevertheless, the composition of the class action settlement
still requires a modification to reduce antitrust concerns. We therefore rec-
ommend post-settlement third-party oversight and scrutiny as an important
safeguard in order to ensure the pricing algorithm’s adherence to competitive
Nash-Bertrand pricing. Competition policy will have to ensure a reduction
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of Google’s monopolistic position in order to safeguard against a monopolis-
tic bottleneck. Nevertheless, attention with regard to the conclusions drawn
is needed. A comprehensive welfare analysis is required to balance all costs
and benefits associated with the Google Book Search settlement. Particu-
larly the eﬀects on the creation of derivative and subsequent copyright works
reveal an interesting field of further research. Also, the analysis of interests of
the diﬀerent parties involved in the Google Book Search settlement appears
to be an interesting avenue for further research from a political economy
perspective (Bechtold, 2010, p. 252). Above all, the Google Book Search
Settlement raises concerns beyond the dimensions of law and economics. In
particular, several aspects regarding technological questions as well as moral
and cultural issues still need to be considered. In the end, the Google Book
Search Settlement will be a first reasonable step towards an unlimited access
to knowledge in the 21st century and a substantial impulse for the future
scientific discussion on the role of copyright law in the information age or
“the future of books in cyberspace” (Samuelson, 2010b). Google is about to
fill an important gap regarding the accessibility of knowledge, as it provides
a retro-digitization in contrast to the Creative Commons and Open Access
movements. However, especially in regard to the field of scientific research,
Google’s search engine provides an added value. Scholars are given a tool to
locate information, lowering their (information) costs to write and publish
academic works. In addition, the option to provide free access to books to
force a maximum distribution and readership may forward the discussion
on the role of copyright in academic works.91 Google could be a third road
to free access to scientific research and create an additional counterbalance
with respect to the conventional publishing model.
91See Shavell (2010) on the recent discussion on whether copyright for academic books
should be abolished. See also Feess and Scheufen (2011).
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